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ISSUE I:
Did the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization (the "Board") satisfy due process
requirements of giving adequate notice, as to the three parcels owned by Nuteam Pension
and Profit Sharing Plan ("Nuteam") and Kennecott Utah Copper Corporation
C'Kennecott"), where the Board had actual knowledge, based on six years of prior
dealings and its current dealings with Alliant Techsystems, Inc. ("ATK") as the taxpayer
on such parcels, that ATK was in fact the "taxpayer" to whom the Board was required to
send notice under Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-1001(4)?
ISSUE II:
When ATK notified the Board of the identity of its designated agent, was the
Board required to include the designated agent when the Board sent notice of the its April
11, 2002 decisions on ATK's protest of the assessed value of all thirty-two parcels?
ISSUE III:
Was ATK required to marshal the evidence in its appeal of the Utah State Tax
Commission's (the "Tax Commission" or "Commission") Amended Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss (the "Order"), where the Commission was procedurally required to
view all alleged facts in the light most favorable to ATK, the non-moving party, and
where ATK is challenging the Commission's conclusions of law?

ARGUMENT
A.

THE BOARD FAILED TO SEND NOTICE TO THE "TAXPAYER," AS
REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW, WITH REGARD TO THE THREE
PARCELS THAT NUTEAM AND KENNECOTT OWN, WHEN THE
BOARD HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE, BASED ON SIX YEARS OF
PRIOR DEALINGS, THAT THE TAXPAYER WAS ATK.
Assuming for purposes of argument that the Court agrees with the Tax

Commission and the Board that ATK's actual receipt of notice of the Board's decision
triggered the 30-day appeals period, notwithstanding the Board's failure to notify ATK's
designated agent, such a ruling cannot logically or in fairness apply to the remaining
three parcels Nuteam and Kennecott own (the "Nuteam/Kennecott Property"). If the
Court's ruling is based on an "actual notice" standard, the same standard should apply to
the Board's failure to notify ATK of its decision as to the Nuteam/Kennecott Property.
For years, and even to this day, the Board has recognized and permitted ATK to protest
and process the Salt Lake County Assessor's assessments of the Nuteam/Kennecott
Property. The Board has actual knowledge that ATK is the "taxpayer," based on a
lengthy history of working with and through ATK in various tax appeals, and is fully
aware that ATK has protested, appealed, argued and paid all assessments on the
Nuteam/Kennecott Property, even though ATK has never been the "owner" of such
parcels. Hence, as to the Nuteam/Kennecott Property, the Board's own course of conduct
is irreconcilably inconsistent with its present result-oriented arguments and notice
practice. The Board's notice to any entity other than the actual taxpayer is insufficient
under Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-1001(4).

The Board and the Tax Commission argue that the Commission's Order should be
affirmed with regard to the Nuteam/Kennecott Property. The relevant portion of the
Order states:
With regard to the parcels owned by Kennecott and Nuteam
Pension and Profit Sharing Plan, Petitioner argues that it pays
the tax and it is, therefore, entitled to notice of the decisions.
We disagree. Petitioner may have a private contractual
arrangement with Kennecott and Nuteam under which it has
agreed to pay the tax, but Petitioner is not the record
titleholder of these properties, nor is Petitioner legally liable
for the tax. Presumably, a property owner can appoint an
agent to receive its tax notices and other property notices by
notifying the County Recorder. Otherwise, the County is
under no obligation to discover and track private contractual
arrangements, and it has no authority to send tax notices or
appeal decisions (which are essentially amended tax notices)
to any lessee who obligates itself for the payment of the taxes.
In this case, the decisions were mailed to the property owners
of record, as required by law.
Amended Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 3-4.
ATK does not seek to dispute the validity of the general rule that "the County is
under no obligation to discover and track private contractual arrangements" for purposes
of sending notice to the individual or organization ultimately liable for paying an
assessed property tax. That claim, however, is a distortion of the facts and reality here.
The Salt Lake County Assessor, the Tax Administrator's Office and the Board all knew
that ATK was the taxpayer on the Nuteam/Kennecott Property. ATK and its agents
personally appeared before the Board—mere weeks prior to its decision—to protest the
assessments on such parcels. Yet no notice of the decision was provided to ATK or its
agent. Sending notice to the party making actual appearance before any board, tribunal

^

or administrative body is well established, routine, and sets the minimum standard. In
this case, where the taxing authority had actual knowledge of the "private contractual
arrangement" between ATK and Nuteam and Kennecott, notice to ATK had to be given
under a proper construction of the statutes invoked by ATK in protesting and appealing
the assessments of such properties, paying the tax, and suing for a refund. Under such
circumstances, the applicable notice statute, Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-1001(4), must
be construed in pari materia1 with the statutes involved to bring the appeals in the first
instance, and applied in conformity with constitutional due process and manifest justice.
ATK does not purport to offer a precise standard of what quantum of actual knowledge is
required in order to fall within an exception to the general rule requiring notice to the
"owner," and not the taxpayer, but if ever a taxing authority should be held accountable
for its knowledge of a private contractual arrangement, this is that case.
The Board was fully aware that ATK, as the lessee with property tax liability for
the Nuteam/Kennecott Property, protested the Salt Lake County Assessor's assessment of
the same property for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002 to the Board and the
Tax Commission.

As a result, the Board was not required to "discover and track"

anything; it had actual knowledge that ATK was responsible for paying the assessed
property tax with respect to the Nuteam/Kennecott Property. The Board's failure to send
notice to ATK, under these circumstances, simply cannot meet the requirements of

1

Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) (holding that statutes are
considered to be in pari materia and thus must be construed together when they relate to
the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object).
A

procedural due process.2 As a result, even assuming the Court rejects ATK's arguments
as to the parcels for which ATK is listed as the record owner, and for the six parcels the
United States Navy owns, ATK respectfully urges the Court to reverse the Commission's
Order as it relates to the Nuteam/Kennecott Property in light of the specific
circumstances of this case.
B.

BY DESIGNATING COUNSEL AS ITS AGENT, ATK REQUESTED THAT
THE BOARD SEND NOTICE OF ANY DECISION REGARDING ATK'S
2001 PROPERTY TAX PROTEST TO THAT AGENT, AND THE
BOARD'S FAILURE TO SEND ADEQUATE NOTICE VIOLATES BASIC
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW.
The Tax Commission attempts to explain the Board's failure to send notice of its

April 11, 2002 decision to ATK's designated agent by stating, "ATK had not requested
that notice be sent to its attorney." (Br. of Resp't/Appellee Utah State Tax Comm'n at
15). Similarly, the Board asserts, "Had ATK asked the Board to send its legal counsel a
copy of the Board's decisions, the Clerk of the Board would have done so." (Br. of
Resp't County Bd. of Equalization at 8-9).

Finally, the Tax Commission's Order

remarkably held, "The Board's rules allow for mailing a courtesy copy [of relevant
decisions] to the taxpayer's representative if the taxpayer affirmatively requests it, but
Petitioner did not request it in this case." Amended Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 4
(emphasis added).
The Tax Commission's conclusion and Respondents' arguments distort reality and
common sense. When ATK designated Maxwell A. Miller as its required agent on the
2

The procedural due process issue has already been adequately briefed; accordingly,
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Practice 24(c), ATK will not include further
discussion in this Reply Brief.

Board's form, ATK understood that it was requesting that the case be prosecuted through
that agent, including the provision of relevant notices. The Tax Commission misstates
ATK's position as an "implicit assumption that a third party cannot deal directly with the
principal where an agent exists who may be authorized to act on the principal's behalf."
Id.

ATK's position implies no such thing.

ATK has never asserted, expressly or

otherwise, that the Board was not authorized to deal directly with ATK. All ATK
expected was that by designating an agent—a term of art embedded with legal
significance—as required by the Board's form, that agent would be included in
communications from the Board. The Tax Commission derides this position as "rel[ying]
solely on provisions of general agency law" for support (Br. of Resp't/Appellee Utah
State Tax Comm'n at 15), and the Board turns its nose at ATK's citation to a legal
encyclopedia as authority (Br. of Resp't County Bd. of Equalization at 19); however,
sarcasm is not argument. Both the Board and the Commission fail to explain why general
agency principles—and basic notions of common sense—do not govern this case.
There is yet a further problem with the Tax Commission's conclusion that, despite
ATK's designation of an agent, ATK never requested that its agent be included in
communications. If this conclusion is a finding of fact, it should have been viewed in the
light most favorable to ATK under Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) and Acord v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 821 P.2d 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).3
ATK has maintained from the beginning that it did request that the Board send notices to
ATK's agent, Mr. Miller.

In fact, proper resolution of this dispute requires the

Atiya and Acord are discussed infra at section C.

determination of several other factual issues in an evidentiary hearing. For example,
although the Board and the Commission assert that the Board would have included Mr.
Miller in communications if ATK had requested it, there has been no evidence to suggest
that the Board in fact has a mechanism for providing appropriate notice under any
circumstances.

Additionally, it is unclear what kind of request would have been

sufficient to induce the Board to notify Mr. Miller of its decisions; after all, if designating
an agent on the Board's appeal form was insufficient, what kind of notice, precisely,
would the Board honor? These and numerous other factual issues must be addressed if
the assertion that ATK failed to "ask this Board to send its legal counsel a copy" of the
notice is to be maintained. As a result, the matter is inappropriate for final appellate
determination. In short, the Tax Commission's failure to accept ATK's alleged facts for
purposes of deciding the Board's motion to dismiss constitutes reversible error and
further grounds for remanding the case to the Tax Commission for a formal hearing.
The Board makes much of a Colorado case, Tri-Havana Limited Liability Co. v.
Colo. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 961 P.2d 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998), in support of its
position that sending notice to ATK's corporate offices constituted sufficient notice
despite ATK's designation of an agent. Although there are some similarities between
Tri-Havana and the matter presently before the Court, the Board fails to acknowledge a
key distinction that fatally undermines the persuasiveness of Tri-Havana as support for
Respondents' positions.
In Tri-Havana, the taxpayer had never provided notice to the Arapahoe Board of
Equalization ("BOE") that it was acting through an agent. Instead, the taxpayer had filed

with the county assessor a letter appointing an agent. Tri-Havana, 961 P.2d at 605. The
case expressly states that "[n]o such letter was filed with the BOE." Id. By contrast,
ATK designated its agent on the Board's own pre-printed appeal form, thereby giving the
Board unequivocal written notice that it was represented by an agent.4 The distinction
between Tri-Havana and this case is simply stated: in Tri-Havana, the administrative
body hearing the taxpayer's appeal never received formal notice of the taxpayer's
appointment of an agent, whereas in this case ATK provided written notice to the Board
itself. This distinction alone eliminates the Tri-Havana decision as a legitimate basis for
affirming the Tax Commission's Order.
Aside from ATK's formal designation of an agent as required by the Board's
form, the Board had frequent dealings with Mr. Miller as ATK's agent, and actual
knowledge that Mr. Miller was handling all matters associated with ATK's property tax
protests in Salt Lake County. In fact, in addition to numerous appearances on ATK's
behalf in previous years, Mr. Miller had appeared before the Board itself in the very tax
protest that gave rise to this litigation. Even if the Board complied with its own internal
procedures by giving notice to the nameless corporate entity rather than the individuals
with which the Board had been dealing for the past seven years, such a procedure is
contrary to common sense and the "adequate notice" standard.
In other contexts, the designation of an agent unquestionably constitutes notice
that the agent should be included in communications. In the corporate world, when a
Since ATK designated an agent in writing before the Board, it defies credulity to learn
from the Board's pleadings that the Board would have sent notice to ATK's agent "had
ATK asked."

business organization lists a registered agent in its organizational documents, the Utah
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code knows to include the registered agent in
official mailings. In the real estate context, when a buyer lists an agent on the purchase
agreement, the agent becomes the face of the buyer for purposes of further negotiating
and coordinating the transaction. Most obviously, when a party represented by counsel
brings a formal legal challenge, the adjudicative body directs orders and notices to
counsel.

To do otherwise in any of the above examples would render nugatory a

principal's appointment of an agent. The Board's failure to notify ATK's designated
agent of its decision does precisely that, and ATK therefore respectfully suggests that
compliance with such a senseless internal procedure simply cannot satisfy the "adequate
notice" standard.
When viewed in light of the actual facts, the assertion of both the Board and the
Commission—that ATK simply failed to request that notice be sent to Mr. Miller, and
that the Board would have happily sent notice if ATK had only asked—is not well
founded. Furthermore, the Tax Commission's failure to accept ATK's alleged facts for
purposes of deciding the Board's motion to dismiss constitutes grounds to remand the
matter to the Tax Commission for a formal hearing.
C.

ATK WAS NOT REQUIRED TO "MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE" WHERE
THE TAX COMMISSION WAS OBLIGATED TO VIEW THE ALLEGED
FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO ATK, THE NONMOVING PARTY, AND WHERE ATK'S APPEAL CHALLENGES
RULINGS OF LAW, NOT FINDINGS OF FACT.
In its brief, the Tax Commission mistakenly asserts, "ATK has not met its burden

of marshaling the evidence because it has not 'cited all the evidence in the record that

supports the Commission's findings as required.'" (Br. of Resp't/Appellee Utah State
Tax Comm'n at 21 (citation omitted)).

The Board proposes a similarly incorrect

standard, positing that the Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below
due to the alleged failure of ATK to cite to the record. (Br. of Resp't County Bd. of
Equalization at 14-15). The legal standards offered by both the Tax Commission and the
Board are inapposite to the procedural posture of this case, where ATK appeals the
Commission's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The relevant standard is stated as follows: "On appeal from a . . . grant of a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint as true." Atiya, 852 P.2d at 1008. This standard is consistent with the general
rule of marshaling, which "applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to
conclusions of law." Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 n.4 (Utah 2000) (emphasis
added).5 When an appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss, the court "'must accept
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Acord, 821 P.2d at
1196. The Tax Commission's Order contains no findings of fact, nor should it, since the
Tax Commission was procedurally bound to accept ATK's allegations as true.
Accordingly, ATK's appeal does not challenge the Tax Commission's factual findings
and the marshaling requirement does not obtain.
5

See also Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) ("If a challenge is made to
the findings, an appellant must marshal all the evidence . . . . If the appellant fails to
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the records supports the findings
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law") (emphasis added).

In its brief, the Tax Commission acknowledges that "[a]ll of the foregoing issues
present questions of law," (Br. of Resp't/Appellee Utah State Tax Comm'n at 2) but the
Commission then offers to the Court the standard of review for administrative findings of
fact, which is deferential when the findings are supported by "substantial evidence." Id.
Since the Tax Commission's Order contains no findings of fact, the "substantial
evidence" standard has no bearing on this appeal.
Because ATK appeals the Tax Commission's grant of the Board's motion to
dismiss, this Court is required to accept ATK's factual allegations as true and to resolve
all inferences in favor of ATK. See Atiya, 852 P.2d at 1008. ATK's appeal challenges
the Tax Commission's conclusions of law, which this Court reviews for correctness,
granting no deference to the Tax Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) (2002).
Accordingly, any standard relating to a review of the Tax Commission's nonexistent
factual findings is inappropriate and should be disregarded. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1610(l)(b) (2002).

CONCLUSION
The Board's failure to send notice to ATK's designated agent of its April 11, 2002
decisions violates statutory and constitutional requirements. Even if the Court finds that
the Board's notice was adequate with regard to the parcels owned by ATK and those
owned by the United States Navy, the Board's failure to provide notice to ATK, when the
Board had actual knowledge of ATK's obligation to pay the property taxes, cannot
constitute adequate notice. For these reasons, ATK respectfully requests that the Tax
Commission's Amended Order granting the Board's Motion to Dismiss be reversed, and
that ATK be afforded an opportunity to pursue its appeal of the Board's decisions in a
formal hearing before the Tax Commission.
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